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Russians  go  to  the  ballot  box  on  17  to  19  September.  Most  commentators  consider  the
election as a  non- event as all  indicators point to the continuation of  the present regime.
Although major shifts in the parliamentary set up are unlikely it  can be argued that small
changes  are  not  necessarily  insigni�cant.  Even  though  the  present  regime  has  made  the
emergence of signi�cant opposition close to impossible, the changes in Russian society cannot
but manifest  itself  in  the election results.  Even small  changes may have an impact on the
Kremlin balance of power.  Some elements of analysis:
• Russia  is  not  a  one-man  dictatorship.  Within  the  Kremlin  power  structure  various
interest  groups  are  represented:  siloviki  and  oligarchs,  more  liberal  and  more
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conservative elements etc. President Putin has the last word in deciding on compromise
decision  making  that  requires  the  rallying  of  all  groups  once  the  decision  is  taken
(remember  that  old  soviet  principle  of  “democratic  centralism”?).  The  compromise
reached will depend on the relative strength of the various interest groups. A change in
the composition of the Duma will affect parliamentary decision making but even more
the balance of power in the Kremlin leadership. Although of lesser importance than in
the West, public opinion and changes in public opinion (i.a. as revealed in the popular
vote) is a non negligeable element of the Russian political life.
• Where do possible swings in public opinion come from? To begin with, the Yeltsin decade
with its freedom verging upon chaos has shaken the centuries old authoritarianism of
the Russian socio-political  system and to a  certain extent forced people to think for
themselves. The Putin stabilisation (restauration?) has not eradicated the positive and
negative collective memories of the 1990s. The economic growth of the �rst decade of
the 21  century has given rise to a new phenomenon in Russian society: the emergence
of  a  middle  class,  caring  about  their  own  economic  status  and  perspectives  and  not
eager  to  leave  their  destiny  to  an  allegedly  corrupt,  self-serving,  and  incompetent
leadership that has not lived up to its initial promise of ever-growing welfare. The recent
erosion of welfare, in�ation, change in the pension arrangement, the messy handling of
the covid crisis has more widely (beyond the middle class) affected the average Russian’s
perception of government. A new (demographic) evolution has recently impacted the
political  scene  in  all  urban  centres  in  Russia:  the  emergence  of  a  vocal  group  of
youngsters that have never known (directly or indirectly) the totalitarian Soviet regime
and demonstrated against corruption and the various forms of curtailing of freedom.
The  regime may  be  losing its  youth:  protesting youngsters  have  replaced the Nashi-
youngsters of a decade ago. Navalny was the catalyser of this movement and although
not a majority of Russians were supporting his action, the impact was strong enough to
make a signi�cant dent in the existing power arrangements with a possible danger of
provoking a snowball effect.
• Navalny had to be eliminated because for the �rst time the opposition had a credible
“face”:  a charismatic leader with a rallying theme (anti-corruption) an anti-corruption
foundation  (FBK)  and  a  pragmatic  electoral  tactic:  smart  voting.  The  Kremlin  acted
swiftly and decisively. The handling of opposition movements was taken out of the hands
of the “political technologists” that in the past have been able to dismantle emerging
opposition  movements  and  was  handed  over  to  the  siloviki  that  acted  with  ruthless
ef�ciency.  They  proceeded  to  the  elimination  of  Navalny  and  all  his  immediate
collaborators, the expansion of the list of people that cannot be put on an election list
(because  of  previous  misdemeanours),  the  closing  down  of  critical  news  outlets,  the
extension of the list of “foreign agents” (organisations and journalists/activists critical of
government), depriving Russians (and in particular youngsters) of independent sources
st
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of information. However,  the internet is not completely closed off (like in China) and
Russians still have access to independent (i.a. western) internet sites.
How  will  all  this  in�uence  the  voting  and  the  outcome  of  the  elections?  The  attempted
suppression of all critical voices will certainly diminish the strength of opposition votes, but it
will not completely eliminate them.
• The  present  Duma  is  dominated  by  United  Russia  let  by  the  Putin  faithful  Minister
Sergey Shoiga (76 % pf  the seats)  and supported by the three “systemic”  opposition
parties: the conservative left Communist Party led by Gennady Zyuganov (9,3 %of the
seats), the populist ultranationalist (not using a stronger adjective) Liberal Democratic
Party of Vladimir Zhirinovski (8,6 % of the seats) and the centre left Just Russia party led
by Sergey Mironov (5,1 %of the seats). This leaves hardly any place for real opposition
parties  (3  seats  out  of  450)  and  allows the Kremlin to pass  any  legislation including
constitutional changes.
• Where will the 2021 election lead Russia? Fully aware of the limitations of interpreting
opinion polls, they are the only source of information and handled with care they can
yield some interesting possible tendencies.
◦ United Russia’s popularity has been affected by the reduction in living standards,
reform of the pension system and some successful  citizens protest (against the
removal of  a popular governor in Khabarovsk e.g.)  Whereas in the last election
they had a score of about 50 %, some independent pollsters put the United Russia
score down to 30 %.
◦ Smart voting aiding, the score of the systemic opposition goes up in the polls. In
particular, a stronger presence of the Communist Party (according to some polls,
moving up  from  13%  to 18  %  of  the vote)  could have an  impact  on  the power
balance,  also  in  the  Kremlin.  Moreover,  some  individual  Communist  politicians
have been openly criticizing the government, including for its repressive actions
against opposition voices.
◦ Apart from a shift within the systemic opposition, there is a new vigour in the real
opposition parties: the veteran centre right liberal party Yabloko is credited with a
50  %  increase  of  its  score  (modest  though  to  3  %  of  the  votes).  The  Greens
quadruple their score to 2,5 %, and interestingly, a new liberal party, “New People”,
focussing on the entrepreneurial middle class (but not exclusively) has appeared on
the pollsters’ score board with an amazing more than 5 % of the votes. Is the liberal
opposition  (blamed  for  everything  that  went  wrong  in  the  Yeltsin-days)
resurrecting from its ashes after being annihilated in the early 2000s?
◦ These  (marginal)  shifts  are  signi�cant  in  themselves  and  will  certainly  not  pass
unnoticed  in  the  Kremlin  circles.  However,  their  impact  in  terms  of  Duma
representation will  be damped because of the mixed electoral system in Russia.
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Half  the  450  Duma  seats  are  elected  on  a  federal  proportional  representation
system  and  half  on  the  basis  of  a  “�rst  past  the  post”  (majoritarian)  single
constituency  system.  In  the  present  Duma,  elected  in  2016,  United  Russia
translated its 55 % of the vote of the proportional federal system into a 60% of the
seats (140/225).  In the majoritarian single constituencies,  its  50 % of the votes
translated in 90 % of the seats (203/225), giving United Russia a comfortable 76 %
of the seats in the Duma (343/450). To protect United Russia from further erosion
of the number of seats, recently the Duma has decided to transfer 15 seats from
the proportional to the single constituency system. The bias of the majoritarian
system is almost certain to guarantee United Russia a majority in the Duma.
Conclusion
No major changes can be expected from the upcoming elections in Russia: Putin will remain
solidly in power. However, the relative strength of the various actors within the Kremlin may
be  affected,  even  by  small  changes  in  the  election  results,  indicating  shifts  in  the  public
opinion, based on the deterioration of the socio-economic situation and the evolutions within
Russian society.  Some indicators will be important to watch:
• The participation rate in the election (in 2016: 48 %)
• The shifts between United Russia and the systemic parties as well as the strengthening
of the non-systemic opposition parties in the Duma.
• The impact of the system-favourable bias in the single constituency part of the election
and the reaction of systemic and non-systemic opposition and public opinion on this
bias.
• The legitimacy of the result i.e. the degree of (perceived) electoral fraud (including the
single constituency bias).
The reaction of the public opinion will reveal how much of a “democratic �bre” is left (or is
developing)  in  Russian  society.  For  foreign  policy  analysts  it  will  be  crucial  to  decode  the
comments from the Kremlin and the measures taken in the wake of the election in particular
reshuf�ing of the government.
Even a complete status quo (what many observers predict) will be important to analyse. Either
the societal changes in Russia are less important than some analysts argue, or the political
system  has  shown  a  capacity  for  manipulation  and  resilience,  overriding  these  socio-
economic, cultural and demographic changes.
One way or the other, the upcoming elections are not an irrelevant event. They will  be an
important source of information about trends in Russian society and a basis for de�ning and
re�ning Western foreign policy vis a vis Russia.
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